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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1954 landmark case Brown v. BoardofEducation,' the Supreme
Court warned America that a child denied the opportunity of an education
would be unable to succeed in life.2 Forty-eight years after Brown's
promise of educational equality, Americans are inundated with examples
of the decline in the educational performance and quality of our nation's
public schools.' Many parents, especially inner-city parents, are still
searching for a way to secure a meaningful education for their children.4
Several state legislatures have responded to demands for a quality
education in the face of failing public school districts by enacting schoolchoice options, including publicly-funded school voucher programs.'
Presently, three voucher programs are in effect in the United States. Two
state programs apply to a particular school district: Milwaukee,

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
Id.
3. See, e.g., National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP), Reading Achievement
Level Results for the Nation's Fourth-Graders,at http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
reading/results/achieve-pf.asp (last modified Mar. 28, 2001) (reporting that over one-third (37%)
of American fourth-graders scored "Below Basic" on a reading test administered to test illiteracy).
See generally Michael H. Armacost, Foreword, HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE:
PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM INEDUCATION 2-3 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
4. See Cornelius Chapman, Expanding the Prize of School Choice, Pioneer Institute for
Public Policy Research, at http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/research/opeds/prize.cfm (Apr. 19,
1999)(stating that "[a]mong inner-city parents-whites, blacks and other minorities-support for
full school choice has reached landslide proportions.").
5. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (2002); see alsoNational Conference of State Legislatures,
School Vouchers, athttp://www.ncsi.org/programs/educ/voucher.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002):
Florida passed the first statewide voucher program in 1999, and interest in the
issue has never been higher. Although this year was not atypical in terms of the
number of state legislatures examining vouchers the seriousness of debate was
unprecedented. Pennsylvania, New Mexico and Texas all had substantive
discussion about vouchers. In 2000, at least 21 states have proposed voucher
legislation across the country.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/3

2

Daboll: School-Choice Legislation: Constitutional Limitations on State Re
20031

SCHOOL-CHOICE LEGISLATION

Wisconsin,6 and Cleveland, Ohio.' Florida has a statewide voucher
program.' Although each state's voucher program varies somewhat from
the other,9 under a typical program a parent whose child meets certain
eligibility requirements is awarded tuition "vouchers" from the state.'0 The
parent can then use those vouchers to pay tuition at a qualifying school of
their choice, which may include a private-parochial school."
Since the genesis of the school-voucher concept,12 voucher programs
have been met with sharp opposition. 13 In addition to public policy and
political reasons, opponents argue that vouchers violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 4 by
allowing parents to use state funds to send their children to private
religious schools.' 5 However, voucher legislation has also been strongly
supported. 16 School voucher proponents counter that school-choice
legislation does not violate the Establishment Clause.' The Supreme
Court, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris," recently ended this decade long
dispute by ruling that Ohio's school-choice legislation, which permits

6. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2002) (Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
7. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (West 2002) (Pilot Project Scholarship
Program).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38 (West 2002) (Opportunity Scholarship Program).
9. See generally Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a FailingPublicSchool
System, 23 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 73 (2001) (comparing current school voucher programs).
10. Id. at 80-89.
11. Id
12. Although the first school voucher program was enacted in 1990, the concept of a voucher
program was first proposed by Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman in 1955. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 93-96 (proposing competition in education to
promote variety and flexibility).
13. See, e.g., Maureen E. Cusack, The UnconstitutionalityofSchool Voucher Programs:The
United States Supreme Court'sChance to Revive or Revise EstablishmentClauseJurisprudence,
33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 85 (1999); see also ACLU, ACLU CallsSupreme Court Ruling on
Vouchers "Bad for Education, Bad for Religious Freedom," at http://www.aclu.org/
religiousliberty/religious liberty.cfm (June 27,2002); NAACP News, Supreme CourtDecision On
School Vouchers Harmful To Future of Public School Education, at www.naacp.org/news/
releases/eduvouchers062702.shtml (June 27, 2002) (expressing opposition to school vouchers).
14. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ).
15. Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 2000) (challenging Florida voucher
system as unconstitutional); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (challenging
Wisconsin voucher system as unconstitutional).
16. See, e.g., Three More Polls Show Supportfor School Choice, MICHIGAN EDUCATION
REPORT, Winter 1999, at www.mackinac.org/pubs/mer/article.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). See
generally Dominick Cirelli, Jr., Utilizing School Voucher Programsto Remedy School Financing
Problems, 30 AKRON L. REv. 469 (discussing the arguments for and against school vouchers).
17. See Robert A. Levy, School Choice: It Works and It's Constitutional, at
http://www.cato.org/cgi-bin/scripts/printtech.cgi/dailys/02-20-02.html (Feb. 20, 2002).
18. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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public-school children to attend a private-religious school via public
funding, does not violate the Establishment Clause.' 9
With this constitutional hurdle behind them, proponents of school
vouchers expect state legislatures to rapidly begin approving school-choice
legislation as a route to educational reform. 20 But, at least one
constitutional issue still remains for opponents and advocates of school
vouchers, as well as state legislatures contemplating passage of such
programs. The issue that will inevitably come to the forefront of the
school-choice constitutional debate is the extent to which a state can
constitutionally impose regulations on a participating private-parochial
school. 2 ' Religious schools fear that state regulation will violate their right
to free exercise of religion, as provided by the First Amendment.22 A
survey by the Department of Education suggests that a majority of privatereligious schools would refuse to participate in a voucher program that
imposes requirements on participants similar to those currently imposed
on public schools. 23 Yet, opponents, as well as some advocates, of schoolchoice legislation believe that when public taxpayer money provides for
parochial education, stringent accountability and regulatory restrictions
must be imposed on participating private schools. 24 Even states that
currently have voucher legislation on their books impose various
restrictions and eligibility requirements on the private schools that
participate in their school-choice programs.25
This Note explores the constitutionality of school-voucher regulations
that restrict a participating parochial school's religious expression and
curricula. This Note suggests that the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,does not require restrictive state regulations in schoolchoice programs. Furthermore, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits such
state regulation of a parochial school. Part II of this Note provides an

19. Id. at 2473.
20. See Tyll van Geel &William Lowe Boyd, Vouchers and the Entanglement ofChurch and

State, EDUCATION WEEK ON ThE WEB, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm (last visited Sept.
10, 2002) (noting that the Zelman ruling will encourage state and local officials who support
vouchers to go forward with their efforts to have voucher systems adopted in their states and cities).
21. See Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984) (discussing challenges to
governmental regulations imposed on religious organizations).
22. See

Steven

Menashi,

The

Church-State

Tangle,

POL'Y

REV.,

at

http://www.policyreview.org/aug02/menashi-print.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (noting that
fear over state regulation prompted the Milwaukee Archdiocese to urge its thirty-seven parochial
schools to forgo participation in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
23. There's Just No Competition, NEA TODAY, May I, 1999.
24. See, e.g., Menashi, supra note 22.
25. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1102.38(4)(f) (West 2002).
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overview of current state regulations pertaining to a parochial school
participating in a school-choice program, as well as proposed legislation
for school-choice programs yet to be enacted. Part III discusses whether
such regulations are constitutionally required to ensure that a schoolchoice program does not violate the Establishment Clause. Part IV
analyzes whether state school-choice regulations that impede upon a
religious school's religious character violate the First Amendment's Free
Exercise clause. This analysis shows that any school-choice regulation
intruding into an activity that is at the heart of the school's religious role
would violate the constitution. Finally, Part V addresses permissible
constitutional conditions that can be imposed on participating parochial
schools. The discussion demonstrates that after Zelman v. SimmonsHarris,restrictive conditions placed on a religious school's access to a
school-choice program would not be an unconstitutional condition because
the school is not considered a government speaker.
II. CURRENT STATE RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE SCHOOLS
PARTICIPATING IN SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Ohio PilotProjectScholarshipProgram
Under Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program (OPPSP),26 which was
just given the green light by the Supreme Court,2" vouchers are provided
to economically-disadvantaged children who are enrolled in kindergarten
through third grade in the Cleveland School District.28 Any private school,
sectarian or non-sectarian, and any neighboring-public school may
participate in the program if it meets certain criteria.29 Such criteria include
minimum educational standards, 0 admission requirements,3 and class-size
requirements.32 Additionally, the OPPSP precludes a participating private
school from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity.33

26. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (West 2002).
27. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
28. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 331 3.974(A)-(B), .977(C) (West 2002).
29. Id. § 3313.976 (eligibility of private schools and public schools in adjacent districts;

tutorial assistance).
30. Id. § 3313.976(3).
31. Id. § 3313.977. This section sets out the priority for admitting qualified students. For
instance, students already enrolled in the private school have first priority to renew enrollment, then
the siblings of currently enrolled students are admitted. Id. § 3313.977(A)(1)(a)-(b). Next, students
from low-income families are admitted by lottery. Id. § 3313.977(A)(l)(a)-(d). However, a

participating private school may "elect to admit students of only one gender and may deny
admission to any separately educated handicapped student." Id. § 3313.977(B).
32. Id. § 3313.976(5) ("The school enrolls a minimum often students per class or a sum of
at least twenty-five students in all the classes offered.").
33. Id. § 3313.976(4).
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Notably, Ohio also mandates that a participating school may not "advocate
or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the
' 34
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.
B. Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) 35 regulates
participating parochial schools more extensively than the Ohio program.
MPCP provides educational vouchers to any child whose family income
does not exceed 1.75 times the poverty level.36 Private schools
participating in the voucher program are required to comply with antidiscrimination laws, 37 health and safety laws that apply to public schools,3"
meet specified academic standards,3 9 and subject themselves to annual
audits and financial accounting standards.4° Private schools are also
required to dedicate a specified amount of instruction hours to secular
subjects.4
In 1995, when the Wisconsin legislature amended the program to allow
parochial schools to participate, the legislature also included an "opt-out"
provision.42 This provision prohibits a private school from requiring a
voucher student to participate in any religious activity if the student's
parent submits to the43 teacher a written request that the pupil be exempt
from such activities.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. § 3313.976(6).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2002).
Id. § 119.23(2)(a)(1).
Id. § 119.23(2)(a)(4) (requiring the private school to comply with 42 U.S.C. 2000d).

38. Id. § 119.23(2)(a)(5).
39. Id. § 11 9.23(7)(a)(1)-(4). The MPCP requires participating schools to meet the following
standards:
1.
2.
3.
4.

At least 70% of the pupils in the program advance one grade level each
year.
The private school's average attendance rate for the pupils in the program
is at least 90%.
At least 80% of the pupils in the program demonstrate significant
academic progress.
At least 70% of the families of pupils in the program meet parentinvolvement criteria established by the private school.

Id.§ 119.23(7)(a)1-4.
40. Id. § 119.23(7)(b).
41. Id. § 118.165(1)(c)-(d) (West 2002) (private schools must provide at least 875 hours of
instruction each year in reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies, science, and health);
see also Wisconsin Education Association Council, School Vouchers, at
http://www.weac.org/Greatschools/issuepapers/vouchers.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
42. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(C) (West 2002).
43. Id.
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C. FloridaOpportunityScholarshipProgram
Florida's school-choice legislation, known as the Opportunity
Scholarship Program (OSP)," applies statewide and is not limited to lowincome families.45 Instead, the state offers voucher scholarships to any
child who spent the previous school year enrolled in, or is currently
assigned to, a school that for two out of four years has been designated by
the Florida Department of Education as "failing."46 Participating private
schools must demonstrate financial stability,47 comply with antidiscrimination provisions, 48 meet state and local health and safety codes, 49
comply with admission procedures, ° and employ teachers who have either
a baccalaureate degree, teaching experience, or special skills.5
In addition, like the Wisconsin school-choice legislation, OSP contains
an opt-out clause. 2 Each private school must agree not to compel any
voucher student "to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to
worship."" Furthermore, all participating private schools are subject to
instruction, curriculum, and attendance criteria adopted by a nonpublic
school accrediting body. 4
D. ProposedSchool-Choice Regulations Governing
ParticipatingPrivateSchools
In addition to the state regulations already in place in existing schoolchoice programs, commentators have discussed intensifying the level of
regulatory restrictions on participating parochial schools.55 For instance,
future regulations may forbid any participating private school from

44. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38 (West 2002).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1002.38(2)(a)(1).
47. Id. § 1002.38(4)(a).
48. Id. § 1002.38(4)(c).
49. Id. § 1002.38(4)(d).
50. Id. § 1002.38(4)(e) (requiring that participating schools "[a]ccept scholarship students
on an entirely random and religious-neutral basis without regard to the student's past academic
history.").
51. Id. § 1002.38(4)(a)-(g).
52. Id. § 1002.38(4)0); see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
53. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(4)0) (2002).
54. Id. § 1002.38(4)(f).
55. See Priscilla Pardini, Church/State Complexities, Rethinking Schools Online, Winter
1999, at http://www.rethinkingschools.org/specpub/vouchers/vchurl42.htm (stating that "John
Allen, opinion editor of the St. Louis-based National Catholic Reporter, predicts that the kind of
minimal government oversight presently enjoyed by Milwaukee's religious voucher schools will
be short-lived.").
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teaching creationism or that homosexuality is wrong.56 At least one state
legislator contemplating voucher legislation has proposed adding a
requirement that a participating private school may not discriminate on the
basis of gender, sexual orientation, pregnancy, or marital status.57 Current
regulations onlyprohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion and
national origin. 5 These additional state regulations would preclude any
single-sex school from participating in a voucher program.

III.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: STATE REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AFTER ZELMAN

One reason often suggested for including restrictive state regulations,
such as opt-out clauses and religious curricula restrictions, in a schoolchoice program is the need to ensure the program's compliance with the
Establishment Clause ofthe First Amendment."9 The Establishment Clause
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment and prohibits
Congress from making a law "respecting an establishment of religion." 0
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,6' the Supreme Court promulgated a three-pronged

test to determine whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause. 62 The
second prong of the Lemon test prevents a state from enacting a law that
has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 63 In Agostini v.
Felton,4 the Court modified the second prong of the Lemon test, the
"primary effect" prong, by recasting it into three elements: (1)whether the
program results in governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the program's
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Sinicki Promotes Accountability In Voucher Program, WIS Politics.corn

Press Releases, at http://www.wispolitics.com/freeser/pr/prOl 06/June28/pr01 062807.htm (June 28,
2001).
58. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §3313.976(4) (West 2002) (stating that a school may register
if it "does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background"); see also, FLA.
STAT. §1002.38(4)(c) (2002) (requiring participating schools to "[c]omply with the antidiscrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. s2000d"). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d demands that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
59. See Cusack, supra note 13, at 95 (reasoning that Ohio revised its school choice program
and included an opt-out provision in order to "overcome an inevitable Establishment Clause
challenge").
60. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
61. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62. See id. at 612-13. Under this test, a statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if
(1)it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) it does not create excessive entanglement between government and
religion. Id.
63. Id. at612.
64. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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recipients are defined by reference to religion; and (3) whether the
program creates an excessive entanglement between government and
religion.65
Applying this Establishment Clause analysis to a school-choice
program, that program would fail if it results in governmental
indoctrination. In other words, if a court were to determine that the
government, through school-voucher legislation, is compelling a voucher
student to engage in a religious practice or belief, the school-choice
program would violate the Establishment Clause." Consequently, some
state legislatures contemplating an Establishment Clause challenge require
parochial schools participating in the program to allow students to opt out
of religious activities. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in deciding the
constitutionality of the MPCP, adhered to this reasoning as well." In
Jackson v. Benson, the court upheld the constitutionality of Milwaukee's
voucher program.69 In applying the "primary effect" prong of the Lemon
test to the voucher program, the court cited the opt-out clause as evidence
that the program does not advance religion."
Subsequent to the Jackson decision, however, the United States
Supreme Court eradicated the presumed need to include an opt-out clause
or curriculum restrictions in school-choice legislation.7 In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,the Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's schoolchoice legislation determining that it did not violate the Establishment
Clause ofthe First Amendment.' The Zelman Court dichotomized its prior
school funding cases into two distinct categories: direct aid cases and
indirect aid cases." In direct aid cases, government programs provide aid
directly to a religious school.74 In indirect aid cases, government programs

65. Id. at 232.
66. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (holding prayer exercises in school

unconstitutional because they compelled participation in an explicit religious exercise); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987) (holding the teaching of scientific creationism in public
school unconstitutional); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (holding mandatory
prayer and devotional Bible reading at beginning of school day unconstitutional).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(4)0) (West 2002); Wis. REV. CODE ANN. §
119.23(7)(C) (West 2002); see supra Parts II.B. and IIC.
68. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
69. Id. at 623 (holding that as amended the school-choice program "neither compels students

to attend sectarian private schools nor requires them to participate in religious activities").
70. Id. at 617.
71. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
72. Id. at 2473.
73. Id at 2465-67.
74. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (federal program provided educational
computer equipment on a per capita basis directly to private religious schools); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (statute provided aid to private schools through a direct loan of teaching
material and equipment); Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
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provide aid to individuals, who then turn around and use the money at a
religious school. The Zelman majority based its decision on three prior
school funding cases, which held that indirect aid that reaches religious
schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choice of private
individuals does not violate the Establishment Clause.76
In determining whether Ohio's school-choice program has the effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, or as Justice O'Connor phrased it,
"endors[ing] or disapprov[ing]"" religion, the Court held that any
incidental advancement or perceived endorsement of a religious message
through the school-choice program is not attributable to the government.7"
The Court determined that a reasonable observer would not recognize
government aid as carrying the "imprimatur of government endorsement"
when that aid reaches the religious school solely as the result of an
individual and private choice.79
Therefore, even though Ohio's school-choice program does not include
an opt-out provision, the Court held that the program is constitutional.80 If
a school-choice program does not advance or endorse religion because of
the private choice of individuals, then opt out and religious curricula
regulations are unnecessary to ensure compliance with the Establishment
Clause. Private choice simply does not implicate the Establishment
Clause."'
Once the private choice of an individual intervenes between state
money and religion, the connection that raises the Establishment Clause
eyebrow is broken." The children are at the school as a result of their
parents' own, private choice. The school, as a private institution,
implements its own requirements and standards regarding religious
activity. If, absent an opt-out clause, the students at a religious school are
being compelled to pray, it is not the result of state action. 3
(1973) (program provided direct money grants to religious schools through tax credits).
75. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I-I I (1993) (program
permitted sign-language interpreter to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools); Witters
v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986) (vocational scholarship
program provided tuition aide to a blind student studying at a religious institution to become a
pastor); Muellerv. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,399 (1983) (program authorizing tax deductions for private
school tuition costs).
76. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465-68 (citing Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest).

77.
(1984)).
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,691-92
Id. at 2467.
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2473.

81. Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 9, at 94-95.

82. See Levy, supra note 17.
83. See generally Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court's Emerging
Consensuson the Line Between Establishment andPrivateReligious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV.
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The Court's reasoning extends beyond approving the absence of an optout provision in school-choice legislation. No restriction placed on a
participating parochial school for the purpose of avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation is constitutionally required. The
Establishment Clause is not violated because any action taken by a
parochial school is not attributable to the government. Accordingly, state
regulations restricting a participating school's religious activities may be
advisable on public policy grounds, but they are not constitutionally
mandated.

IV.

FREE EXERCISE: SCHOOL-CHOICE LEGISLATION INFRINGING
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

When he recently declared Florida's school-choice program
constitutional, Governor Jeb Bush emphasized the private choice of
voucher recipients." Yet the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program,
like the Wisconsin school-choice program, includes a provision which
requires parochial schools to allow students to opt out of religious
activities.8 " As discussed above, such state regulations are not required in
order to ensure the school-choice program's compliance with the
Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, state legislatures may choose, as a
matter of political concession, to include regulations that restrict the
religious activity of a participating parochial school.
Notwithstanding political considerations, a regulation that inhibits a
participating parochial school's religious autonomy may not only be
constitutionally unnecessary, but constitutionally prohibited. In other
an intrusive state regulation could be unconstitutional in its own
words,
86
right.

681, 682 (2001) (stating that the emerging Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a
specialized application of the state action doctrine). Thus, the Court has found religious activity to
be unconstitutional when "instigated, encouraged, or-in the strongest case-coerced by the
government," but permissible when it is "the product of private judgment." Id.
84. John Ellis "Jeb" Bush, Why School Voucher Programs Are Constitutional, The
Constitution at Work, at http://www.constitutioncenter.org/sections/work/separate.asp (last visited
Nov. 1, 2002).
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1102.38(4)0) (West 2002).
86. See Pardini, supra note 55. Arguing against a potential bill that would increase state
regulation of a parochial school participating in Milwaukee's school choice program, Matthew
Barry, a staff attorney for the Institute for Justice stated, "[t]his bill would expand the state's
regulation of private schools to such a degree that the constitutionality of the entire program could
be at risk." Id.
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A. ConstitutionalProtection of ReligiousInstitutionalAutonomy
Federal constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognized that
the First Amendment protects a church's autonomy.87 A religious
organization must be allowed to govern itself and to decide questions of
doctrine free of government intervention or oversight.88 For this reason, the
Supreme Court affords a religious organization protection to decide, free
from governmental intrusion, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.89
Church autonomy is not absolute, however. The First Amendment only
protects a church from state interference with religious functions that
affect the heart of the church's role.' For instance, in Donovan v. Alamo,9 '
the Supreme Court upheld wage regulations that applied to a religious
institution because the regulations did not infringe upon the critical and
unique role of the religious school.92 Similarly, courts have held that public
safety requirements, such as fire safety standards, apply to religious
institutions because such regulations do not infringe on the constitutionally
protected interests of the religious organization.93
Conversely, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago94 held that the
National Labor Relations Act did not confer jurisdiction upon the NLRB
over a Catholic secondary school.95 The NLRB argued that the churchoperated school had violated the Act by refusing to recognize or to bargain
with unions representing lay faculty members of the school. 96 The
Supreme Court reasoned that, in view of the fact that the NLRB's exercise
of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools would implicate
the guarantees of the First Amendment's religion clause, the Act must be

87. Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (declaring unconstitutional
a New York statute that had the effect of displacing one church administrator with another);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 7 (1929) (noting that the decision
of whether to appoint a Chaplain is a canonical act exempt from judicial review).
88. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court'sLaw of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?,70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 597-601 (1995).
89. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
90. See Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1983), aff'd
sub nom. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 403.
93. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985);
Mkt. St. Mission v. Bureau of Rooming & Boarding House Standards, 541 A.2d 668, 672 (N.J.
1988).
94. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
95. Id. at 507.
96. Id. at 494.
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construed narrowly, and thus found that the Act did not authorize the
NLRB to exercise jurisdiction over the school.97
In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized the "critical and unique
role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school."9
Furthermore, the Court distinguished the employment regulation at issue
from regulations requiring fire inspections or state laws mandating
attendance, reasoning that the latter did not "have the clear inhibiting
potential upon the relationship between teachers and employers with
which the present Board order is directly concerned." 99
Applying this same reasoning, parochial schools participating in a state
school-choice program enjoy a constitutionally guaranteed right to
religious autonomy respecting decisions involving the religious expression
of the school. In the case of school-choice legislation, opt-out provisions
or restrictive curricula regulations would infringe upon the parochial
school's "unique role." Certainly a parochial school's ability to regulate
its religious curricula or religious expression, such as praying, is at the
heart of the parochial school's religious role. Therefore, such religious
practices should invoke even greater free exercise protection than the
protection afforded to the parochial school in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
involving teacher-school relationships.
B. Employment Division v. Smith: School-Choice Legislation
Must Be Neutraland GenerallyApplicable
Moreover, even if a court finds that a particular school-choice
regulation, such as an opt-out provision or curricula requirement, does not
infringe upon the constitutionally protected unique role of a religious
school, the regulation may still not pass constitutional muster. In
Employment Division v. Smith,0 0 the Court held that a generally applicable
and otherwise valid regulatory law, which was not intended to regulate
religious conduct or belief and only incidentally burdened the free exercise
of religion, did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.'0 ' But, the government may not enforce a restriction that
purposefully discriminates against religion or a religious practice without
a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored.'0 2

97. Id. at 501-04.
98. Id. at 501.
99. Id.at 496 (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 11,12, 1124 (7th Cir.
1977)).
100. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
101. Id. at 878-79.
102. Id.; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (applying strict scrutiny analysis and finding unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting
a church's use of animal sacrifice because the ordinance was not neutral or generally applicable);
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To be sure, state school-choice regulations requiring parochial schools
to abide by local health and safety laws or to meet statewide academic
standards are generally applicable neutral laws." 3 Such regulations apply
to all participating private schools, regardless of the religious nature, and
the obvious governmental purpose for such regulations is to protect the
health and welfare of the voucher student and to ensure the academic
success of the voucher program.
On the contrary, the state could not reasonably argue that a regulation
such as an opt out clause, which focuses specifically on a parochial
school's religious practice of praying, worshiping, or engaging in religious
activity, is a generally applicable or neutral law. Its force purposefully
strikes at the heart of religious activity. By its very nature, it is not
applicable to a non-religious private school because a non-religious private
school expresses no religious belief from which to opt out. Under the same
reasoning, regulations restricting religious curricula or doctrine within a
participating parochial school are equally non-neutral.
Since state school-choice regulations such as opt-out provisions and
religious curricula restrictions are not generally applicable and neutral
laws, the state must prove that the regulations further a compelling
governmental interest that cannot be achieved by means less restrictive to
the religious practice. 1 The Court has held that avoiding a violation ofthe
Establishment Clause is a compelling state interest.'0 5 As noted above,
however, the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris0 6 decision unequivocally held
that school-voucher programs, such as the one in Cleveland, do not violate
the Establishment Clause.° 7 Accordingly, a state would be precluded from
offering compliance with the Establishment Clause as a compelling
interest for school-voucher regulations that restrict a parochial school's
religious expression.
For this reason, a state would need to assert an alternative compelling
interest for imposing a regulation that infringes upon a parochial school's
free exercise rights. Courts have held that protecting children from child

Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply substantial
burden requirement "to non-neutral government actions [because such] would make petty
harassment of religious institutions.., immune from the protection of the First Amendment").
103. See generally Department of Education, State Regulation of Private Schools, at
www.ed.gov/pubs/RegPrivSchl/intro.html (June 2002) (describing state regulations that apply to
private schools).
104. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
105. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Ku Klux Klan, 515 U.S. 753,761-62
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,394 (1993); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
106. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
107. Id. at 2467.
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abuse is a compelling reason to infringe on a fundamental right."°8 For
instance, if a parochial school's religious expression inflicted physical
abuse upon a child, the state could undeniably prohibit such conduct.
Requiring parochial schools to allow voucher students to opt out of all
religious activities on this basis would not, however, be the least restrictive
means for preventing abuse of school children. Most religious conduct
falling within the realm of an opt out provision, such as praying and
religious instruction, does not constitute physical abuse. In fact, criminal
statutes already in place offer an alternative means of protecting school
children from any such abuse. Therefore, opt-out regulations would be
unnecessary.
Another compelling state interest that could potentially be asserted to
defend an intrusive school-choice regulation is the need to ensure the
educational quality of voucher students." 9 Maintenance of a student's
ability to think critically could be offered as a reason to restrict religious
curricula or to restrict a parochial school's ability to compel a student to
engage in a religious practice.I' Nevertheless, given the reasoning behind
the inclusion of parochial schools in a school-choice program, this
rationale would probably fail. Apparently, most private parochial schools
are administering a quality education or else they would not be offered as
an alternative or answer to a failing public school district. It is paradoxical
to assert that a parochial school currently instructing students on religious
matters should be included in school-choice legislation because it offers
the voucher student a chance of a quality education, and yet maintain that
a voucher student's quality education must be ensured by restricting
religious instruction.
In short, it is doubtful whether a state would be able to constitutionally
justify regulations that purposefully discriminate against religion, such as
the opt-out clauses in the Florida and Wisconsin school-choice legislation,
or any other state legislation that restricts a parochial school's right to
practice and teach religion to all of its students according to the dictates of
its own internal policy.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS ON GOVERNMENT FUNDING

A parochial school does not waive its constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion by virtue of participating in a school-voucher system.
108. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,434-35 (1979) (finding a compelling state interest
in quickly and effectively removing victims of child abuse from their parents); Paul P. v. Verniero,
170 F.3d 396, 404, 435 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that a compelling state interest in preventing
sexual offenses and abuse was sufficient to justify a deprivation even if a registrant's fundamental
right was implicated).
109. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
110. See id.
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Many commentators have declared, and others have assumed, that a
parochial school automatically subjects itself to the heavy hand of state
regulation once it accepts public tax dollars from voucher students."' This
assertion is flawed for two reasons. First, the parochial school is not the
beneficiary of government money in a voucher program - the student's
parent is the beneficiary. Second, a parochial school's eligibility for
participation in a school-choice program is akin to government opening a
forum rather than government subsidizing speech.
A. Defining the Beneficiary in a School-Choice Program
The parent, and not the parochial school, is the beneficiary of
government funds in a school-voucher program." 2 The majority opinion
in Zelman repeatedly emphasized that the private, independent choice of
voucher parents broke the connection between government funding and
religious inculcation." 3 The Court in Zelman stated that the Cleveland
voucher program disbursed educational assistance to a broad class of
individuals, "i.e., any parent of' a4 school-age child who resides in the
Cleveland City School District.""
This statement exemplifies the Court's recognition that the parent, not
the private school, is the entity receiving a financial benefit from the
government. 5 Therefore, the line of First Amendment cases holding that
government may regulate conduct that it subsidizes does not apply to
regulation of a participating parochial school." 6 Since government funding
is directly payable to the parent, the state can and does regulate the
parent's use of the public money." 7 The government's right to condition
funding on adherence to certain regulations does not apply to the parochial
school, however, since it receives no money directly from the
8
government. "1

111. See generally Geel & Boyd, supra note 20.
112. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2468.
113. See id.
at 2466-73.
114. Id. at 2468.
115. Id.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 120-33.
117. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(5)(b) (West 2002) (obligating participating parents
to comply fully with the private school's parental involvement requirements).
118. Cf OHIOREv. CODEANN. § 3313.979 (West 2002) ("Each scholarship or grant to be used
for payments to a registered private school ...is payable to the parents of the student entitled to
the scholarship or grant.").
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B. UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine Applied to
School Choice Legislation
Although a private parochial school is not a direct beneficiary of state
funds under a voucher program, the argument could be made that the
school nevertheless receives a government benefit by being allowed access
to the program. To illustrate, one could analyze school-choice legislation
as two separate programs: one that allows parents a government financial
benefit, and one that allows private schools access to a government
program. Yet, applying this analysis to the voucher system would still
dictate that a state regulation impeding the Free Exercise rights of a
parochial school is unconstitutional, because of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.ll9
To determine whether government has imposed unconstitutional
conditions upon the receipt of a public benefit, the courts draw upon the
now established dichotomy between Rust v. Sullivan 20 and Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia."' The Rust rule posits
that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in
which the government is itself the speaker, or government uses private
speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program. 22 For
instance, in Rust, the Court upheld the government's restriction on
counseling for, or advocating in favor of, abortion in a government funded
family planning program.' 23 Thus, when the government is speaking, it has
a right to restrict that speech to its intended message.' 24
On the other hand, if the government is merely providing a forum for
others to speak, it may not condition forum access on the speaker's waiver
of a constitutionally protected right.'25 For example, in Rosenberger,the
Court suggested that a university could fund private student publications
but could not constitutionally exclude from the subsidy program any
publication that addressed the subject of religion.' 26 The Rosenbergercourt
distinguished Rust, reasoning that in Rust the government was hiring

119. See David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions:ChartingSpheres ofNeutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); see also Charles R. Bogle,
"Unconscionable" Conditions:A ContractualAnalysisof Conditionson PublicAssistance Benefits,

94 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 193 ("The unconstitutional conditions doctrine attempts to set limits on
any government's ability to regulate its citizens' conduct through disbursement of benefits.").
120. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
121. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
122. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-203.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829.
126. Id. at 845-46.
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private speakers to convey the government's own message. 27 In
Rosenberger, however, the government was expending funds "to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' 28
Following this analysis, a condition upon access to a school-choice
program that impedes a parochial school's religious freedom will be
upheld if a school-choice program is considered government speech.
Indeed, opponents to school-choice legislation have stated just that
proposition.'29 They argue that school-choice programs are more like a
Rust circumstance because education constitutes government speech, not
a platform or forum for private speech as in Rosenberger.30
On the contrary, the Zelman decision implicitly held that a voucher
program was not considered government speech.' As noted above, the
Zelman Court held that the inclusion of religious schools in a voucher
program does not violate the Establishment Clause.' 32 Although the
Zelman Court did not specifically address the issue, a finding that a
parochial school lesson does not constitute government speech necessarily
underlies the Court's determination that school choice is constitutional.
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from professing a
religious belief or engaging in a religious practice."' If the government
were the speaker in a school-choice program, then certainly government
could not include religious schools in the program at all. The Zelman
Court held, however, that the incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, in schoolchoice legislation is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients,
not the government whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.'34
Therefore, unlike the Rust case, in which the government used a
physician's clinic to further its pro-life message, the government's
message in school-voucher legislation ends at the doorstep ofthe parochial
school. School-voucher programs are more analogous to the Rosenberger
case in which the government is simply providing public funds to open
access to private speech, and the governmenf cannot constitutionally
condition that access upon on a recipient's agreement to refrain from
exercising its constitutional rights.

127. Id. at 833.
128. Id. at 834.
129. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems
of Government Neutrality, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 243, 255-56 (1996).
130. Id. at 254-55.
131. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
132. See supra note 72.
133. See supra note 66.
134. Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2473.
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VI. CONCLUSION

An intrusive state regulation that impedes a private parochial school's
religious expression could undermine the goal of school choice
legislation.' If voucher laws weigh down private schools with the same
regulatory regime that now burdens the public educational system, school
choice will amount to no choice at all. The distinctive characteristics that
flow from a private school's autonomy, including parochial private
schools, may potentially be the source of its educational success.
Opponents of school-choice legislation may baulk at the idea of
restricting the authority of the state to regulate participating parochial
schools. Indeed, participating private schools must be held to some level
of public accountability to ensure the voucher student's educational
success, safety, and welfare. For instance, Florida's Opportunity
Scholarship Program'3 6 subjects the eligibility of private schools
participating in the program to control and accountability requirements
"reasonably necessary to secure the educational public purpose ......137
The need for public accountability must not, however, be extended to
the point that a participating parochial school's constitutionally protected
free exercise rights are infringed. There is a sharp distinction between
educational, financial, and health and safety regulations, and regulations
that control a school's religious expression. School-choice regulations,
such as Florida's requirement that participating private schools
demonstrate fiscal soundness 131 or Ohio's requirement that participating
schools meet minimum class attendance standards, 139 constitute neutral and
generally applicable regulations. Furthermore, such accountability
regulations do not infringe upon the critical and unique role of the
religious school. Therefore, such regulations do not violate the Free
Exercise rights of a participating religious school.
The Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris40
removes any need for forcing a religious institution to forfeit a piece of its
autonomy in order to maintain the constitutionality of the school-choice
program. Intrusive state regulation that impedes upon a parochial school's
religious expression is not necessary, and in fact such regulation is most
likely unconstitutional. The Zelman decision makes it clear that states may

135. See Menashi, supranote 22 (arguing that a school-choice program that forces schools to
compromise their religious missions and to accept governmental oversight in admissions and
curriculum is ultimately self-defeating).
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38 (West 2002).
137. Id. § 1002.38(1).
138. Id. § 1002.38(4)(a).
139. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(5) (West 2001).
140. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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allow parents to choose religious schools under a voucher program.141
Prior Establishment Clause case law makes it clear that the state may not
then follow the children into the religious school and regulate their
exposure to religious doctrine and expression without a compelling reason.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in Zelman, "the government['s] role ends
with the disbursement of benefits."' 42

141. See id.
142. Id. at2467.
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